Hosted by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea
House of Lords of the UK Parliament
July 01, 2025
On July 1, 2025, the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS) was formally invited to the House of Lords of the United Kingdom Parliament to provide expert testimony on Asia-Pacific security policy. This engagement represents a significant precedent, as it marks the inaugural occasion a U.S. policy group has been extended an invitation to address the UK Parliament. Prior American invitees have included high-level officials such as the United States Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights, sitting Members of Congress, and Special Policy Advisors from both the Department of State and the White House. This event provided a timely and critical platform for discussing the prevailing international geopolitical landscape.
Part 1: Introduction to the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
By Hee-Eun Kim, CAPS President & CEO
Good afternoon, distinguished Members of Parliament, esteemed Lords, Ladies, and honored guests,
It is with the deepest sense of honour and a profound sense of purpose that I rise to address you today within these hallowed chambers of the United Kingdom Parliament. I extend my heartfelt gratitude to the All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea, with particular appreciation to our esteemed hosts, Sir Iain Duncan Smith MP and Lord David Alton.
Their steadfast commitment to the universal principles of human dignity, justice, and international security—especially in the face of the complex and enduring challenges emanating from the Korean Peninsula—stands as a beacon of moral clarity and courageous leadership. Their work not only illuminates the path forward but also galvanizes our collective resolve to uphold the values that bind us across nations and generations.
I stand before you today as a representative of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy (CAPS), a Washington, D.C.-based, non-profit, and truly multinational think tank dedicated to fostering enduring peace, stability, and shared prosperity across the dynamic Asia Pacific region. It is an honor for CAPS to address the esteemed UK Parliament, recognizing the region’s pivotal role in global security and contributing to a deeper understanding of its strategic significance.
Our foundational mission is to empower leaders across government, security, and the private sector with policy recommendations that are not only insightful and pragmatic but most importantly, actionable. These analyses and recommendations are not the product of abstract theorizing; they are deeply rooted in empirical rigor and shaped by a balanced, multidimensional understanding of the intricate security dynamics that define this vital and increasingly consequential region.
We are not merely an institution—we are a consortium of seasoned practitioners, bound by the conviction that only through informed dialogue and collaborative strategic foresight can we effectively navigate the geopolitical complexities of our time.
What truly distinguishes CAPS—indeed, what makes us a rare voice within the Washington policy landscape—is our genuinely multinational, fiercely independent, and resolutely practitioner-driven ethos. This is not a rhetorical flourish; it is the very foundation of our operational philosophy. We transcend the limitations of any single national agenda and deliberately move beyond the confines of academic insularity. Our strength lies in the diversity of our contributors—veteran diplomats, senior military strategists, leading economists, and experienced policy architects—each bringing real-world expertise and a plurality of national perspectives to every analysis we undertake.
We are committed to depth over breadth. Rather than offering transient commentary, we engage deeply with critical issues to uncover enduring insights. Our core focus areas are carefully selected to reflect the interconnected nature of today’s global challenges. Chief among them is economic security and resilience—not merely as aspirational goals, but as the indispensable foundation upon which regional peace and prosperity must be built.
Equally, we pursue a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the Asia Pacific in all its dimensions—its vast geographies, its rich cultural tapestries, its diverse political systems, and the complex historical legacies that continue to shape its present and future.
Moreover, CAPS serves as a vital bridge in an increasingly fragmented global landscape. We connect regions, convene experts, and foster authentic dialogue—often grounded in firsthand experience—on the most pressing issues facing the Asia Pacific. This commitment to genuine perspective enables us to move beyond headlines and soundbites, and instead, to grasp the deeper forces shaping regional and global transformation.
We recently had the distinct honour of engaging in a bilateral dialogue with His Excellency Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, Secretary-General of ASEAN, and previously with His Excellency Ban Ki-moon, the 8th Secretary-General of the United Nations—exchanges that exemplify our dedication to high-level, candid, and consequential discourse.
We regularly convene and contribute to international forums, such as our recent strategic dialogue on U.S.-China competition and economic security, held in collaboration with partners from the United Kingdom, United States, NATO Headquarters, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Australia, Austria, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, India, and the EU Business Council. In addition to economic security, our collaborative efforts have also focused on other critical domains, including maritime security, food security, and pharmaceutical security, each representing essential pillars of regional resilience and global stability. Our leadership in these areas, including our sessions at premier international gatherings, underscores CAPS’s unwavering commitment to fostering informed, multi-stakeholder dialogue—dialogue that bridges divides, deepens mutual understanding, and advances collective security.
The Enduring Importance of the Asia Pacific Region: A Nexus of Global Destiny
The Asia Pacific is not merely a region demarcated by geography—it is, without exaggeration, the epicenter of 21st-century geopolitics. Its significance transcends cartographic boundaries, shaping the trajectory of global affairs across economic, strategic, and security dimensions.
First, from a demographic and economic standpoint, the Asia Pacific is an unparalleled engine of global dynamism. Home to more than half of the world’s population and encompassing some of the most vibrant and rapidly evolving markets, the region contributes an ever-increasing share of global GDP. From the technological frontiers of Seoul and Tokyo to the manufacturing powerhouses of Southeast Asia, and the vast consumer bases of China and India, the region’s economic pulse reverberates across the world. Disruptions here—whether through trade disputes, supply chain shocks, or climate-induced economic stress—send immediate ripples through global markets. At CAPS, our sustained focus on economic security is rooted in this reality: the Asia Pacific is not just a participant in the global economy—it is its primary driver.
Second, strategically, the region is the crucible of global power competition. Three of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—the United States, China, and Russia—are deeply embedded in the region’s affairs, alongside rising powers such as India, Japan, and South Korea. The interplay of interests among these actors—sometimes cooperative, often competitive—profoundly shapes the global security architecture. Maritime security in critical chokepoints, unresolved territorial disputes, and intensifying regional rivalries all carry implications that extend far beyond the region. The South China Sea, in particular, remains a flashpoint where contested claims and military posturing risk dangerous miscalculation. These realities underscore the urgent need for robust, rules-based frameworks and unwavering adherence to international law.
Third, and perhaps most acutely relevant to today’s dialogue, the Asia Pacific is where some of the most complex and consequential security challenges of our time converge. From the persistent threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean Peninsula—a central concern of the esteemed All-Party Parliamentary Group—to the evolving dynamics of great power rivalry and the erosion of democratic norms and human rights, the region demands a nuanced understanding and coordinated international engagement.
Please allow me to briefly elaborate on the escalating situation on the Korean Peninsula. Recent developments reveal a deepening military alignment between North Korea and Russia. Pyongyang is reportedly supplying significant quantities of artillery and ballistic missiles to support Moscow’s war in Ukraine. In return, North Korea is receiving advanced military assistance, including electronic warfare capabilities and accelerated drone technologies. This reciprocal exchange is not only destabilizing multiple regions—it poses immediate and direct threats to South Korea and the broader Indo-Pacific. While some advocate for a policy of “stable coexistence” with a nuclear-armed North Korea, such a posture risks normalizing a grave humanitarian crisis and undermining long-term regional stability. The pursuit of verifiable denuclearization, the alleviation of human suffering, and the preservation of peace on the peninsula are imperatives that transcend national borders and demand unified global resolve.
The Indispensable Architecture of Regional Stability: ASEAN and APEC
In confronting these multifaceted challenges, we must recognize the indispensable role of regional institutions such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). These organizations, through their commitment to dialogue, economic integration, and multilateralism, serve as pillars of regional stability and, by extension, global security.
ASEAN, in particular, exemplifies how a diverse coalition of nations—differing in political systems, economic models, and stages of development—can construct and sustain a resilient framework for peace and cooperation. Through mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM-Plus, ASEAN has significantly enhanced regional security via joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and coordinated maritime security initiatives. These efforts have been instrumental in mitigating tensions, especially in contested areas like the South China Sea, while safeguarding vital trade routes and promoting economic resilience.
The so-called “ASEAN Way”—characterized by consensus-building, non-interference, and quiet diplomacy—may appear methodical, even slow. Yet, it has proven remarkably effective in building trust, fostering shared norms, and preserving strategic autonomy for member states amidst intensifying great power competition. ASEAN’s continued vitality is a testament to the power of soft diplomacy and the enduring value of regionalism in a fragmented world.
Similarly, APEC, as the preeminent forum in the Asia Pacific for facilitating trade and investment, spurring economic growth, and fostering regional cooperation, plays an equally vital and complementary role. Its foundational “Bogor Goals” of free and open trade and investment have been a powerful engine, driving significant reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers across the vast region, leading to expanded economic growth and profound interconnectedness. APEC’s work extends far beyond mere trade liberalization, actively striving to strengthen critical supply chain connectivity and improve the overall business and investment environment. Furthermore, APEC’s agenda has proactively expanded to encompass broader security issues that directly impact economic prosperity, such as concerted efforts to counter terrorism, enhance regional health security, and address pressing energy challenges. Through its dedicated focus on economic and technical cooperation, APEC also systematically builds the institutional capacity of developing economies to effectively implement and fully benefit from trade and investment reforms, fostering a shared prosperity that is absolutely fundamental to long-term regional stability. This broad and diverse membership, encompassing economies of all sizes and stages, highlights the potent power of shared economic interests in transcending political differences and contributing directly to a more predictable and stable global security environment.
The enduring success of these regional groups in cultivating trust and fostering shared prosperity within their inherently diverse frameworks is a profound testament to the transformative power of sustained engagement. Their collaborative efforts to enhance economic interdependence, harmonize regulatory standards, and facilitate seamless trade create strong and compelling disincentives for conflict, ultimately bolstering global security stability by weaving a complex web of shared interests.
CAPS: Contributing to a Shared Future
CAPS fundamentally believes that addressing these multifaceted and interconnected challenges demands far more than just reactive policies. It necessitates proactive, innovative, and deeply collaborative strategies. It requires the strengthening of existing alliances, the forging of new coalitions based on shared values, and the unwavering promotion of a rules-based international order. Our dedicated work focuses on providing the intellectual bedrock for such ambitious strategies, meticulously bridging the critical gap between rigorous academic analysis and actionable, real-world policy. We are proud of our collaborative efforts, exemplified by the Memoranda of Understanding we have signed with distinguished institutions such as the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, King’s College London, and Sungkyunkwan University in South Korea, underscoring our enduring commitment to international education, joint research, and the cultivation of future leaders. Our Global Future Leaders Initiative Cadet Forum also speaks directly to our long-term vision of nurturing the next generation of strategic thinkers, equipping them with the insights necessary to navigate the complexities ahead.
Today’s dialogue, encompassing discussions on North Korea as well as broader strategic challenges in the Asia/Indo-Pacific, is a prime and pressing example of the critical conversations that are not just desired but practically needed. The dire humanitarian situation within the DPRK, the imperative pursuit of verifiable denuclearization, the long-term stability of the Korean Peninsula, alongside critical security considerations for Taiwan and the South China Sea, are issues that unequivocally transcend national borders and demand urgent, unified global attention and clear understanding.
Now, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to our CAPS members for their unwavering support in making this meaningful discussion possible. As CAPS is a volunteer-driven organization, I offer special thanks to:
- Ambassador Thomas Schäfer, CAPS Senior Advisor, who traveled from Germany to share his candid insights on “Opportunities, Engagement, and Challenges in Relations with North Korea and Broader Regional Dynamics.”
- Mr. David Maxwell, CAPS Vice President, who accompanied me from Washington, D.C., to provide his in-depth analysis on “U.S. Approaches to Asia and the Indo-Pacific—particularly Taiwan, North Korea, and the South China Sea—and Strategies to Prevent Major International Conflict.”
- Mr. Brian Howell, CAPS Senior Advisor and Vice President at Archer Daniels Midland, who flew in from Switzerland, is the expert on Food Security.
- Ms. Ji-hyun Park, CAPS Senior Fellow on Human Security, who joined us from Manchester despite her demanding schedule.
Thank you once again for this invaluable opportunity to share our mission and insights. We look forward to a productive and enlightening dialogue and reaffirm our steadfast commitment to advancing a peaceful, prosperous, and secure Asia-Pacific—an essential pillar of global stability and security.
Part 2: “Opportunities, Engagement and Challenges in Relation to North Korea”
By Dr. Thomas Schäfer, CAPS Senior Advisor
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for inviting me to these historic premises for an exchange of ideas on North Korea. I am particularly glad as I have always considered the cooperation between the British and the German embassy in Pyongyang to be exemplary. We worked in the same building, lived on the same compound and met and talked with each other continuously. For example: Whenever I wrote a draft of a joint report to Brussels by the EU embassies – and it happened quite often as there were so few EU embassies there – I always took the draft to my British colleagues first, to discuss it and, of course, get the language improved. And in 2009, the two embassies built a beautiful Korean pavillon on our compound together, as a compliment to Korean culture, but what for me was a symbol of British-German cooperation as well.
I have been tasked to speak about „Opportunities, Engagement and Challenges in Relation to North Korea“. In the presence of so many people with high expertise on the country, I will restrict myself to a couple of points which seem essential to me in our attempts to modify Pyongyang’s internal and external behavior: North Korea’s leadership structure, its political goals as a consequence of its threat assessment, and the conclusions we might draw with regard to our own policy.
I served in Pyongyang from 2007 to 10 and again from 2013 to 18. Sociological changes (the emergence of a new traders’ class, accompanied by pronounced changes in income distribution) mainly occurred during the last years of Kim Jong Il‘s reign and the first years under Kim Jong Un. Pyongyang became a bit more colorful while the rest of the country basically remained as it had been.
As to policy, a shift towards more conservative positions in internal, external, economic policy as well as ideology occurred right after Kim Jong Il’s stroke in August 2008. That was the price Kim Jong Il had to pay to the armed forces and other members of the elite for them to accept Kim Jong Un as successor. Kim Jong Un’s position was not automatically bestowed on him through a dynastic mandate, but was the result of negotiations between his father, who was physically and politically weakened, and the armed forces and other members of the elite.
But not all members of the elite were happy with the conservative shift and pushed back. I believe that between 2008 and the end of 2015/the beginning of 2016 there was a transition period characterized by a sometimes violent confrontation within the North Korean leadership about the course the country should take. Differences of opinion were notable in nuclear policy (mainly as to the speed with which nuclear armament should be pursued), budget priorities (Military vs. civilian sector; heavy vs. light industry), Pyongyang’s South Korea policy (keywords are the Kumgangsan tourist zone, the Kaesong special economic zone, family reunions, military provocations along the border), the attitude towards economic reforms (agrarian policy, “enterprise reform”, special economic zones, foreign investment in general, in short: “The Chinese Dream”), the degree of self-isolation. To be sure: it seems that there was also consensus in some areas as, for example, the maintainence of the Stalinist system and population control, by, among other things, supervising and limiting private market activities and increasing the supervision of the border areas, and ideological controls.
At the beginning of 2016, the hardliners in the leadership had prevailed. Two of the most influential “moderates” (Kim Yang Gon and Kang Sok Ju) died around that time, and the 7. Party Congress in May 2016, inspite of some seemingly positive yet only formal changes (for instance: replacement of the State Military Commission by the State Affairs Commission) seemed to demonstrate that the hardliners (Military, Organisation and Guidance Department, and others) had prevailed. Examples for increased military influence: General Kim Yong Chol became successor of Kim Yang Gon as Head of the United Front Department; it was explicitly stated that the Military should be in charge of relations with South Korea and of “socialist construction”. And there was hardly any mention of economic reforms. Since then, I have only detected very few indications of political differences within the leadership.
As to Kim Jong Il’s and Kim Jong Un’s role: Even during Kim Jong Il‘s time, there were opposing opinions within the leadership: hardliners called humanitarian aid a ploy to contaminate the country with spiritual pollution, and there were differences on foreign investment. Even after Kim Jong Il and the South Korean President had agreed on foreign investment in Oct. 2007, the 2008 New Year‘s Editorial spoke out against it. A general with whom I talked about the SixPartyTalks at that time told me: “We let Kim Jong Il proceed, but watch carefully. If necessary, we know how to protect our interests.” Also, the military had always been opposed to the Special Economic Zone of Kaesong although it had been one of Kim Jong Il‘s pet projects.
I believe that at least until 2016, Kim Jong Un has been a much weaker leader than his father. At times, he seemed to be overwhelmed by the infighting within the leadership, not in control of the decision-making process, or even not involved at all. I can give you examples, if you want to.
(Examples for conflicts and an insufficient role by KJU: In his first public speech, KLI announced “no more belt-tightening”, but only months later, by adopting the Policy of Parallel Development, the military expenditure was vastly increased to the detriment of the civilian economy.
The closure of the Kaesong Industrial Zone in 2013: high ranking officials admitted to me several times that Party and Military followed conflicting policies. As to Kim Jong Un, it would have been in his interest that Kaesong remained open as his legitimacy was exclusively based on his family ties, and as an attack on Kaesong had always been considered as equivalent to an attack on Kim Jong Il himself.
Preparations for an inter-Korean family meeting in 2014 and attempts (also in 2014) to improve relations with Seoul when the Party’s efforts got more or less highjacked by the military.
The inter-Korean mine incident in August 2015: Kim Jong Un‘s contribution was limited to retrospectively approving the actions of the armed forces although they had apparently acted against the will of the relevant department of the Workers’ Party, and it had been the Party officials that had resolved the situation peacefully.)
The lack of political control and consistent policy until around the end of 2015 is the most important indication that Kim Jong Un, at least during those years, was not the leader and decision-maker that North Korean propaganda made him out to be. As to his role since then, I do not know: He might have increased his share of power. But it is also possible that his lack of influence has only become less visible. I suppose that nobody outside North Korea, except perhaps the Chinese and the Russians, really knows.
In any case, in the last ten years, hardliners have shaped the country’s policy. So what are their main political objectives? What are the factors they consider as particularly threatening to regime survival?
Of course there is the understandable thought that Pyongyang might be attacked by outside forces. Iraq and Lybia are often mentioned by Pyongyang and I can understand that the conventional deterrence might be deemed not to be sufficient.
But the feeling of being threatened internally is probably much more important. Investment, aid, tourism, the presence of foreigners in general are regarded as dangerous.
Like other regimes with a similar mindset, the current North Korean leadership views cooperation with foreign countries as a latent threat to the stability of the regime. But on top of that, it also fears that the influx of destabilizing ideas might lead to a German-style reunification of the two Koreas “by absorption,” as Pyongyang calls it. The division of the country with the freer and more prosperous part south of the border, is considered an existential threat.
The regime in Pyongyang knows that, just as the battle cry of the East German demonstrators at the end of the 1980s changed from “We are the people!” to “We are one people!” within a short time, the North Korean people as well could conclude that joining the South would be the quickest and easiest path to a better life.
But in defending against foreign ideas, Pyongyang finds itself in a Catch-22 situation. It sees the huge and increasing development gap between itself and its neighbors — in particular South Korea — as an existential threat. At the same time, however, it also believes that the means to make up for the shortfall, namely reforms and opening up, would not only weaken the strict controls imposed on its population but also exacerbate the threat of absorption by South Korea. This marks a dramatic difference between North Korea and China and helps to explain why North Korea has been much more resistant to reforms than China or Vietnam.
The solution? Pyongyang thinks that it is to get South Korea under its control — however unrealistic it is. “Reunification,” in Pyongyang’s terms, has always been more about control than merging the two societies. To Pyongyang, it has meant that in a first phase the two systems of government and society as well as the inter-Korean border would be maintained, and financial support would be provided by the South. A common foreign and security policy would be created, and U.S. troops and the U.S. nuclear umbrella, both essential elements in deterring North Korea from attacking the southern part of the peninsula, would be withdrawn from South Korea.
The final phase — and this indeed was made very clear to me in my conversations with the officials — would be a united Korea dominated by and modeled along the lines of Pyongyang. That’s why, in my view, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s announcement that his country would end efforts to achieve a “peaceful” unification and would regard South Korea as a “hostile” nation, does not alter Pyongyang’s intention to get South Korea under its control — however fantastical it is.
North Korea can only hope to somehow neutralize the South once the alliance between South Korea and the United States has been weakened. And this is what is has been trying to do for many years.
When Pyongyang called for a peace treaty in 2014 and 2015, I repeatedly asked representatives of various institutions what the treaty should include. The answers always included the withdrawal of U.S. troops and, sometimes, getting rid of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Sanctions relief was only mentioned incidentally. At least since 2012, Pyongyang had been saying that progress on the question of denuclearization can only be made if the US abandons its ”hostile policy.” Whenever I asked for a definition of the end of hostile policy slogans, the answers had been similar: The end of maneuvers and the withdrawal of troops ranked first, the lifting of sanctions was subordinate.
Starting in 2016, I occasionally spoke with North Korean officials about President candidate and later President Trump. During those talks, I sensed that Pyongyang would try to use Trump’s personality and his fixation on spectacular “deals” to obtain concessions previously considered unattainable. It was also obvious that North Korea would not be willing to give up its nuclear weapons. One official speculated that a “deal” with Trump could possibly consist of Pyongyang’s renunciation of further arms development in exchange for formal recognition as a nuclear power, as well as other political and economic concessions.
The talks confirmed my belief that North Korea would mainly focus on advancing its own security policy — that is, being recognized as a nuclear power, cessation of U.S.-South Korea joint maneuvers, and withdrawal of U.S. troops. As to sanctions relief, we assessed it was only Pyongyang’s secondary concern.
So before the Trump-Kim summits began, we concluded to Berlin that Pyongyang would try to persuade Trump to strike a quick just-for-show deal that would result in a temporary and precarious détente, but might also lead to a lasting weakening of the alliance between Washington and Seoul. In June 2018, Trump in fact announced that the U.S. military would stop joint military exercises on the Korean Peninsula. Although the Trump-Kim meetings up to Hanoi, Vietnam, in 2019 did not give everything Kim had asked for, Pyongyang surely believes that Trump’s second presidency might give North Korea a second chance to further its objectives, that is, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula, the weakening of the U.S.-Korean alliance, and, ultimately, control of South Korea by Pyongyang. In spite of all the propaganda coming out of Pyongyang, I am convinced that it would love to give negotiations with Trump another try.
I also believe that, until then, North Korea will continue to ratchet up tensions with South Korea in order to provide Trump with a possible “success”. Their thinking is: The more we increase tensions, the more we can back down during negotiations, and the more “benefit” President Trump can claim for having „saved peace“.
Real progress, however, will remain elusive. The hardliners see in aid, foreign investment, special economic zones, and other forms of economic cooperation less of an opportunity than a risk to the regime’s stability. Therefore, they will not be enticed by economic incentives including
sanctions relief to give up nuclear weapons. Only once North Korea’s moderates regain some control might Pyongyang again move toward economic reform, opening, and -hopefully- denuclearization.
Even if the chances to resume a promising dialogue with North Korea appear slim for the time being, there is one move that South Korea, the US, and possibly Japan, could untertake now. Washington, along with Tokyo, should follow Seoul’s lead and offer to establish liaison offices in Pyongyang. Such a proposal — unconditional, with no strings attached and preferably as part of a trilateral initiative — would demonstrate the political will to put relations on a sounder basis.
The difficulty of putting together such an initiative, and the likelihood of being rejected should not stop it. The absence of any political conditions would convincingly demonstrate the allies’ willingness to engage, talk and negotiate. For the American and Japanese governments, it would also constitute a new approach from former administrations. Offering to establish liaison offices would squarely put the political responsibility for not establishing steady communication channels where it belongs, namely on Pyongyang. In any case, a presence on the ground in Pyongyang is something that all three countries quite urgently need.
And this brings me back to the initial question: I believe that one of the crucial intelligence challenges is to obtain a better understanding of the policy discussions within the North Korean leadership (divergent objectives, contents, and methods), the leading circle’s power structure, the relative importance of different strains of thought (I do not have any evidence of organized “factions” within the leadership), and the way policies are being advocated and decided within this circle.
It goes without saying that a better understanding of the North Korean power structure would enable the international community to adapt and improve its policies and negotiating positions vis-à-vis North Korea. For example, in negotiations, a top-down-approach is less promising if the counterpart is not a sole ruler, but a group of – basically unknown – people with divergent views among themselves. And understanding the composition of the counterpart is also important for assessing what kind of political or economic incentives might be attractive to them. As I said: For many hardliners, economic incentives like joint ventures, special economic zones or even a modern high speed train crossing North Korea from the Chinese to the South Korean border are not particularly desirable as they fear the influx of foreigners, foreign ideas and, as a result, destabilizing effects.
Past negotiations with North Korea were essentially based on the assumption that Pyongyang just wanted to deter and protect itself from any outside aggression. It was hoped that confidence-building measures, security guarantees, and the prospect of economic development, including the lifting of sanctions, would suffice for North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons. However, such an agreement could at best contain, but not satisfy, Pyongyang’s offensive ambitions. The intention to oust US troops and destabilize South Korea and coerce it into political dependency on the North, cannot be negotiated away; it has to be renounced, which would require a shift in opinion in Pyongyang.
As to UK and Germany, I would recommend the same: try to reopen permanent communication channels, try to re-establish some presence on the ground in Pyongyang – to entertain a steady dialogue with the regime, and also to understand better what is going on in the country. You do not need to have fully functioning embassies to achieve that: for a start, it would be sufficient to station somebody in Beijing, have him or her travel to Pyongyang every two or three weeks, have a round of talks, and do the reporting from our embassies in Beijing.
Part 3: “America First, Allies Always: Securing the Asia/Indo-Pacific Together”
By David Maxwell, CAPS Vice President
Introduction
My Lords, Ladies, and distinguished guests – especially the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea and its Chairs, Lord Alton of Liverpool and Sir Iain Duncan Smith MP.
It is a great honor to speak before this historic body on the future of a region that may well determine the course of the 21st century. The Asia-Indo-Pacific is no longer a distant geopolitical theater; it is the central arena of strategic competition, ideological confrontation, and alliance cooperation. Today, I bring a message of unity and resolve: the United States and its allies possess the strategic agility and collective strength to face and overcome multiple simultaneous security challenges in the region.
But we must act with clarity. We must act together. We must act now.
As a former serving U.S. Army officer I am no longer constrained by military doctrine, government funding, or a chain of command so I can give you my objective assessment. That said, if I were asked to do so I would provide this as my best military and national security advice for my country and our allies.
Except for those who are actually from or have lived there, there are no experts on north Korea. I am merely a student of one of the most complex strategic challenges we face. Although I may sound like I am speaking with authority based on my years of study and internalization of the problem, the fact is north Korea is a “hard target” and that anything I say can and should be challenged.
I come to you with a simple but powerful message: Our organizing principle must be: “America First, Allies Always.” We possess the strategic agility to manage multiple security challenges in the Asia-Indo-Pacific simultaneously, and we must do so in concert with our allies. Our strength is not only in our forces, but in our friendships. “America First” does not mean America alone. It means “Allies Always” – because alliances are America’s asymmetric advantage. At the same time alliances are the asymmetric advantage for our allies. The silk web of alliances allows all to punch above their weight. They cannot be matched by any authoritarian bloc.
But let me also add that I know U.S. domestic politics are challenging and frustrating for our allies. I would like to offer that in my many discussions with U.S. officials that there is absolute certainty that allies are critical to U.S. national security and that every military and civilian professional I have spoken with will advocate for our alliances. I know there are many who would agree with this construct, “Allies First, America Always.” I know I certainly do.
To overcome these challenges from our domestic politics my recommendation is to adopt the concept that already exists – “burden owning.” We all must own the burden of our own defense and then together we can develop alliance strategies to address the mutual threats that face us in the Asia-Indo-Pacific and around the world.
Strategic Environment in the Asia/Indo-Pacific
Let us begin by examining the terrain we are navigating. I use Asia-Indo-Pacific quite deliberately because I do not believe we can neglect Asia in our description. I know the policymakers will argue Asia is within the Indo-Pacific. But Asia is at the center of the Indo-Pacific, and it is where the military, political, and economic power resides. Although beyond the scope of this presentation I would argue that due to the increasing interconnectedness and the shrinking of the globe we should also always talk in terms of Eurasia.
The Asia-Indo-Pacific region today is shaped by the contest among three categories of powers:
First, modern nation-state powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. These states uphold the international system based on individual liberty, liberal democracy, free markets, the rule of law, and universal human rights. We have values based alliances and partnerships from the QUAD to AUKUS to the Indo-pacific Four with NATO. (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the Republic of Korea).
Second, revisionist powers like China and Russia, who seek to reshape that international order to better serve authoritarianism.
Third, revolutionary or rogue powers — North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist organizations — that aim to destroy and replace the existing global order altogether.
In actuality, the new descriptor that some scholars are using, the “CRInK” (China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea) might itself be considered the revolutionary power that seeks to destroy the rules based international order that was conceived after World War II. This axis of authoritarians or Dark Quad as Christoper Ford has named them are creating crises around the world that challenge the countries who seek stability and security so that all can share in prosperity. Robert Kaplan in his recent book Waste Land, describes the current geopolitical challenges and issues best in this excerpt:
“This is certainly not a world governed by a rules-based order, as polite gatherings of the global elite like to define it, but rather a world of broad, overlapping areas of tension, raw intimidation, and military standoffs. Indeed, there is no night watchman to keep the peace in this brawling, tumultuous world defined by upheaval. Globalization, which is based on trade, the large-scale movement of people by jet transportation, and rapid technological advances in the electronic and digital realms, fits neatly together with a world in permanent crisis. That is because the permanent crisis demands a dense webwork of interactions between crisis zones across the earth, which globalization produces.”
The real threat might be what the US intelligence Community’s Annual Threat Assessment describes as “adversarial cooperation.” Although the US considers China as the “pacing threat,” I argue that US alliances and partnerships must recognize and address the larger threat of cooperation, collaboration, and collusion among the so-called “CRInK.” At the heart of this strategic competition between the “CRInK” and the modern nation-states is an ideological contest. This requires deft use of the diplomatic and informational instruments of power and not only the military and economic tools. The permanent crises Kaplan describes are a result of the conflict between open and closed societies.
We should ask ourselves what brings the “CRInK” together and how is it like our alliances? There are four reasons for their cooperation: Fear, weakness, desperation, and envy. They fear the strength of our alliances as despite our current frictions time and again we have demonstrated the power of alliances. They have inherent weaknesses within their political systems that make them vulnerable – Putin’s weakness is highly visible in his war in Ukraine, his inability to keep Assad in power, and the support he is currently unable to provide to Iran. They are desperate for support, particularly Russia and north Korea as seen in their current military cooperation. Lastly, they envy our alliances. However, they will never share the values and trust that we do, and their relationships can never be more than transactional. This is playing out with Iran who is receiving very little support if any from the members of the “CRInK.” There are already cracks in the “CRInK” that we should exploit.
These threats require a strategy of comprehensive deterrence, agile response, seizing the initiative, and unified resolve. We cannot fight yesterday’s wars. We must prepare for tomorrow’s contingencies while addressing the ongoing crises throughout the world.
Taiwan and Korea: Not Either-Or, But Both-And
There is an unstated policy debate that focuses on the question: If we must choose, is Taiwan or Korea more important to U.S. national security? This is a false choice.
The answer is unequivocal: we must prepare to deter war and defend in both.
Weakness in one part of the theater invites adventurism in the other. China watches the Korean Peninsula for signals of American resolve. North Korea watches Taiwan for signs of distraction. We cannot afford to let one crisis unravel the deterrence architecture of the other.
That is why the United States must optimize its posture across the region. This includes: – Strengthening joint force integration and command relationships in Korea and Japan; – Enhancing the rotations of U.S. forces in Australia and the Philippines; – Prepositioning equipment and expanding access agreements with trusted regional partners; and ensuring that all U.S. forces are ready for simultaneous contingencies, not just sequential crises.
We must remember that strategic competition is not linear. It is concurrent, multi-domain, and ideological.
Strategic Agility Platforms Across the Region
To support this level of preparedness, the United States and its allies must invest in and deploy Strategic Agility Platforms (SAPs) throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific. These are not merely forward bases or logistics hubs. They are modular, adaptive, and resilient platforms – physical, digital, and doctrinal – that enable rapid projection of power, engagement, and influence across contested and uncertain environments. They are built on existing military bases throughout the region but also require development of others in strategic locations throughout the region in concert with our friends, partners, and allies.
Strategic Agility Platforms include: – Prepositioned equipment and munitions in dispersed, survivable facilities across Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands and in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia; – Mobile command and control nodes that can relocate dynamically and maintain operational tempo during cyber or kinetic disruptions; – Interoperable logistics and sustainment networks built in cooperation with allies and capable of supporting multi-domain operations from Australia to Korea; – Digital infrastructure for defensive and offensive information warfare, enabling coalition-wide influence operations, cyber defense, and real-time strategic communications. Underpinning all of this is the absolute requirement for deep investments in integrated missile defense.
The purpose of these platforms is to avoid a single point of failure, enhance decision-making speed, and ensure our ability to operate from a network of locations rather than a handful of vulnerable bases. SAPs will allow us to impose multiple dilemmas on our adversaries, complicating their targeting calculus while reinforcing our own flexibility and initiative.
In short, strategic agility must be more than a concept. It must be built into our physical infrastructure, our planning assumptions, and our alliance integration.
The Two Plus Three Strategy for Korea
To address the unique security challenge of the Korean Peninsula, we advocate a Two Plus Three strategy. This strategy is founded on two enduring pillars and three transformative components.
The first pillar is military deterrence to prevent war. Deterrence remains the most vital national interest of the United States on the peninsula. The permanent stationing of U.S. troops, combined with the Republic of Korea’s advanced military, has been the backbone of peace for seventy years.
The second pillar is strategic strangulation – a deliberate use of economic sanctions, law enforcement, diplomatic pressure, cyber defense and cyber offense, and financial actions to cut off North Korea’s access to illicit revenue, proliferation networks, and international legitimacy. We must target the regime’s lifelines, from weapons sales to Iran and Russia, to overseas slave labor and cybercrime.
But these two pillars are not enough. The North Korean threat cannot be restrained indefinitely. It must be solved. That is where the three transformative components come in:
- A human rights upfront approach. We must put the human rights of the Korean people on every agenda. The regime commits crimes against humanity to stay in power. These abuses are not only moral outrages; they are indicators of regime vulnerability. Information about universal human rights is an existential threat to Kim Jong Un.
- A comprehensive information and influence campaign. The most dangerous weapon against a closed society is the truth. We must equip the Korean people in the north with the knowledge, tools, and networks to organize, communicate, and ultimately seek their own destiny. As history shows, regimes built on lies collapse when their people learn the truth.
- Support for Korean self-determination. The “Korea question,” the unnatural division of the peninsula as described in paragraph 60 of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, must be solved by the Korean people. Our role is not to dictate unification but to enable it. A free and unified Korea, a United Republic of Korea (U-ROK) is the only path to true denuclearization, permanent peace, and justice.
While these three components are not new ideas what makes this transformative is that all three must be combined and prioritized for action in ways that have never been tried. This is a radical departure from the long held belief that we must be single focused on the nuclear threat.
Linking Freedom in Taiwan to Unity in Korea
There is an ideological connection between the defense of Taiwan and the liberation of the Korean people in the north. Both stand as flashpoints between open and closed systems. Both are test cases of our credibility.
Taiwan is a thriving democracy facing relentless pressure from Beijing. If Taiwan falls, it will embolden authoritarian regimes everywhere. But a free Taiwan is of little strategic value if, in the same breath, the Korean Peninsula is lost to a combined north Korean and Chinese sphere of influence.
That is why our strategy must be whole-of-theater, not piecemeal. As the UK understands from its global maritime legacy, freedom of navigation, access to sea lanes, and open trading systems depend on regional stability in East Asia and throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific.
Allies as Asymmetric Advantage
Allies are not liabilities. They are our force multipliers, intelligence enhancers, logistics enablers, and moral compass. This is why our posture must be anchored in our alliances. And allies gain as much asymmetric advantage from owning their defense burden while operating within a silk web of alliances.
Japan’s evolving defense policy and closer U.S.-Japan command integration are game-changers. Australia’s rotational hosting of U.S. Marines enhances southern theater readiness. AUKUS will boost our strategic capabilities. The Philippines’ access agreements expand operational reach. South Korea remains a global pivotal state and a top-tier contributor to the rules-based order and is a partner in the arsenal of democracies.
Let us be clear: authoritarian powers have no real allies. China has client states. Russia has enablers. North Korea has customers. But the free world has partners.
That is why we must say: “America First, Allies Always.”
The Moral Imperative of Human Rights
As we pursue hard power strategies, we must not neglect the moral dimension. The crimes committed by the Kim family regime are the worst since the Holocaust. Gulags. Starvation. Slave labor. Repression. And our silence is complicity.
A human rights upfront approach is not a distraction from security; it is integral to it. As President Reagan said, “A bird cannot fly with only one wing.” Military strength must be matched with moral clarity.
Human rights are not only a moral imperative they are a national security issue. The Kim family regime must violate human rights to build its nuclear weapons. The regime derives hard currency from its overseas slave labor. It survives only though the denial of the human rights of the Korean people in the north.
By empowering the Korean people with truth, solidarity, and hope, we undermine the regime’s legitimacy from within. As Gandhi inspired Martin Luther King, and as the American Declaration of Independence inspired Korea’s 1919 March 1st movement and Declaration of Independence, so too must we complete the virtuous circle of liberty and unification.
I describe a Korean strategy in 12 words:
“Unification first, then denuclearization, the path to unification is through human rights.”
Strategic Recommendations
To sustain peace and secure freedom in the Asia-Indo-Pacific, I offer these strategic recommendations:
- Elevate Korea policy to a strategic priority equal to Taiwan. Simultaneity must replace sequential, or worse, stove piped or compartmented planning.
- Institutionalize the Two Plus Three strategy with full alliance coordination.
- Expand rotational access and interoperability across Australia, the Philippines, and Micronesia.
- Restructure U.S. forces for dual-apportioned missions to respond to both Korea and Taiwan.
- Fund and empower political warfare capabilities to expose and defeat China’s and north Korea’s subversion – China’s Unrestricted Warfare and its “Three Warfares” and the Kim Family regime’s political warfare with Juche characteristics.
- Support South Korea’s 8.15 Unification Doctrine, which offers the clearest path to resolving the Korean question.
- Adopt whole-of-society information campaigns to support human rights, fight censorship, and enhance digital resistance and resilience.
- Invest in Strategic Agility Platforms to ensure flexible, survivable, and scalable operations throughout the Asia-Indo-Pacific.
- Sustain the “silk web” of alliances and partnerships from the 5 bilateral treaty alliances to QUAD and AUKUS and supporting security arrangements directly among allies.
Conclusion
Let me close with a historical caution: In 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech that excluded Korea from America’s defense perimeter. Six months later, war broke out. Miscalculation thrives in strategic ambiguity.
Today, let us not repeat the Acheson mistake. Let us draw the line of defense boldly, through unity, strength, and purpose. Or perhaps we should draw no line at all.
The Asia-Indo-Pacific is not America’s burden alone. It is the shared responsibility of all free nations. With strategic agility, trusted allies, and unshakeable values, we will prevail.